ABSTRACT

Henry More’s well-catalogued attack of Cartesian metaphysics has distracted scholars from exploring the reasons for the Cambridge Platonist’s abiding attraction to Descartes’s moral psychology. Even after he had become disillusioned with the implications of Descartes’s substance dualism, More defended a moral vision that relied heavily on the Frenchman’s treatise on the passions. Through a careful treatment of More’s ethical philosophy as expressed in his Enchiridion Ethicum (1668) and of the implicit moral argument of Descartes’s Passiones Animae (1650), this article explores the vast expanse of common ground these philosophers held in common. Fundamental to their shared moral vision is their conviction that the passions were fundamentally good and that they could be shaped by the will to defend against the effects of unbridled passion, including violence and atheism. More saw Descartes as an ally who also understood that the passions were the means by which the soul could become God-like.

摘要

亨利·莫尔对笛卡尔形而上学的详细编目攻击分散了学者探索剑桥柏拉图主义者对笛卡尔道德心理学持久吸引力的原因。即使在他对笛卡尔的实质二元论的含义感到幻灭之后，莫尔仍为一种严重依赖于法国人关于激情的论文的道德愿景进行了辩护。通过仔细处理莫尔在他的Enchiridion Ethicum (1668) 中表达的伦理哲学和笛卡尔的Passiones Animae隐含的道德论证(1650)，这篇文章探讨了这些哲学家共同拥有的广泛的共同点。他们共同的道德愿景的基础是他们坚信激情从根本上是好的，并且可以通过意志来塑造它们，以抵御肆无忌惮的激情的影响，包括暴力和无神论。More 将笛卡尔视为盟友，他也明白激情是灵魂变得像上帝一样的手段。