The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience's phenomenology does not need to match that object). On the other hand, you cannot have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless you stand in the right sort of causal relation to that object (no matter how closely your experience's phenomenology matches some object). According to the continuity thesis, property perception is similar to object perception in these two respects. A standard reason to reject the continuity thesis is the assumption that the environmental properties that a perceptual experience presents are determined by its phenomenal properties (which are not determined by the environmental properties that cause the experience). I maintain that the continuity thesis is false but for a different reason: perceptual experiences present both objects and properties via manners of presentation; but, whereas perceptual manners of presentation for objects are purely relational, perceptual manners of presentation for properties are satisfactional.

中文翻译：

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感知属性与感知对象

您看到某个特定对象的事实似乎是由于您的视觉体验与该对象之间的因果关系，而不是由于您的体验的现象特征。一方面，只要你的经验中的某些现象元素与某个对象存在正确的因果关系，你的经验就会呈现那个对象（你的经验的现象学不需要匹配那个对象）。另一方面，除非您与该对象处于正确的因果关系中（无论您的体验的现象学与某个对象的匹配程度如何），否则您无法获得呈现某个对象的感性体验。根据连续性命题，属性感知在这两个方面与物体感知相似。拒绝连续性命题的一个标准理由是假设感知体验呈现的环境属性是由其现象属性决定的（这不是由导致体验的环境属性决定的）。我认为连续性命题是错误的，但出于不同的原因：感知体验通过呈现方式呈现对象和属性；但是，虽然对象的感知表示方式是纯粹的关系，但属性的感知表示方式是令人满意的。