ABSTRACT

Consumers in Chile of private and semi-private pension systems are not selecting the pension providers that give them the largest Net Present Value. Regulators present retirees with a comparison report of pension plan offerings ranked by the amount offered and the risk classification of the provider. A field experiment implemented in Chile explores alternative presentations of provider performance. We treat respondents by modifying the status quo information ‘package’ (that exactly replicate what is currently provided by the regulator). Two design choices clearly enhanced consumer welfare in this experiment: Reducing the amount of information improved choice – specifically eliminating the risk profiles of providers leads to better decisions by our respondents. Second, adopting a loss frame also resulted in respondents selecting providers that generated higher returns. These gains from modifying information presentation were considerably higher for those with lower levels of financial literacy. This study is conducted in association with the Superintendencia de Pensiones (SP) and the Comisión para el Mercado Financiero (CMF), two of the public offices that oversee the pensions market in Chile.

摘要

智利的私人和半私人养老金系统的消费者没有选择给他们带来最大净现值的养老金提供者。监管机构向退休人员提供养老金计划产品的比较报告，按提供的金额和提供者的风险分类对其进行排名。在智利实施的一项现场实验探索了提供商绩效的其他表现形式。我们通过修改现状信息“程序包”（完全复制监管机构当前提供的信息）来对待受访者。在此实验中，有两种设计选择可以明显提高消费者的福利：减少信息量可以改善选择-特别是消除提供商的风险状况可以使我们的受访者做出更好的决策。第二，采用亏损框架还导致受访者选择产生更高回报的提供商。金融知识水平较低的人通过修改信息表示获得的收益要高得多。这项研究是与Superintendencia德Pensiones（SP）和Comisión第下午梅尔卡多Financiero（CMF），两名负责监督智利的养老金市场的公职。