In practice, the demanders (customers) and providers (sellers) of logistics service platforms not only care about prices but also are sensitive to the spatial distance between each other (because longer distance would lead to longer service waiting time). We study the impacts of spatial distance preference on two competing logistics platforms' pricing strategies. Two groups of agents (demanders and providers) are required to pay the logistics service platform a fixed (registration) fees to gain access. We analyze two commonly seen scenarios in practice: (i) the single-homing model—both demanders and providers can only join one of the platforms; (ii) the competitive bottleneck model—demanders (providers) can join only one of the platforms while providers (demanders) are allowed to join both platforms. We find that under the single-homing setting, an increase in demanders' (providers') distance preference would lead to higher but lower (lower but higher) prices charged to demanders and providers, respectively, and higher profits of both platforms. Under the competitive bottleneck model, however, the price charged to demanders (providers) might decrease (increase) in demanders' (providers') distance preference. Finally, compared to the case in which both sides single homing, we find that allowing providers or demanders to join both platforms would decrease the profits of both platforms if users' distance preference is sufficiently low or high.

中文翻译：

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具有竞争和用户距离偏好的物流服务平台定价策略

在实践中，物流服务平台的需求者（顾客）和提供者（卖家）不仅关心价格，而且对彼此之间的空间距离很敏感（因为距离越远，服务等待时间就越长）。我们研究了空间距离偏好对两个相互竞争的物流平台定价策略的影响。两组代理（需求方和提供方）需要向物流服务平台支付固定（注册）费用才能获得访问权限。我们分析了实践中常见的两种场景：（i）单归模式——需求方和提供方都只能加入其中一个平台；(ii) 竞争瓶颈模型——需求者（提供者）只能加入其中一个平台，而提供者（需求者）可以同时加入两个平台。我们发现在单宿主环境下，需求者（提供者）距离偏好的增加会导致分别向需求者和提供者收取更高但更低（更低但更高）的价格，以及两个平台的更高利润。然而，在竞争瓶颈模型下，向需求者（提供者）收取的价格可能会降低（增加）需求者（提供者）的距离偏好。最后，与双方单归的情况相比，我们发现如果用户的距离偏好足够低或足够高，允许供应商或需求方加入两个平台会降低两个平台的利润。以及两个平台的更高利润。然而，在竞争瓶颈模型下，向需求者（提供者）收取的价格可能会降低（增加）需求者（提供者）的距离偏好。最后，与双方单归的情况相比，我们发现如果用户的距离偏好足够低或足够高，允许供应商或需求方加入两个平台会降低两个平台的利润。以及两个平台的更高利润。然而，在竞争瓶颈模型下，向需求者（提供者）收取的价格可能会降低（增加）需求者（提供者）的距离偏好。最后，与双方单归的情况相比，我们发现如果用户的距离偏好足够低或足够高，允许供应商或需求方加入两个平台会降低两个平台的利润。