A firm selects applicants to hire based on hard information, such as a test result, and soft information, such as a manager's evaluation of an interview. The contract that the firm offers to the manager can be thought of as a restriction on acceptance rates as a function of test results. I characterize optimal acceptance rate functions both when the firm knows the manager's mix of information and biases and when the firm is uncertain. These contracts may admit a simple implementation in which the manager can accept any set of applicants with a sufficiently high average test score.

中文翻译：

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选择申请者

公司根据硬性信息（例如测试结果）和软性信息（例如经理对面试的评估）选择应聘者。公司提供给经理的合同可以看作是对接受率的限制，取决于测试结果。当公司知道经理的信息和偏见混合时以及公司不确定时，我就描述了最优的接受率函数。这些合同可以接受一种简单的实现方式，其中经理可以接受任何具有足够高的平均考试分数的申请人。