This article examines the conditional effect that repression has on non-violent vs. violent mass mobilization. While governments often resort to violence to deter future mobilization, studies of the repression–dissent nexus have produced divergent evidence with regard to the effect of repression. Many argue that repression tends to backfire, while others demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing mobilization. I argue that the effect of repression varies by differing opposition tactics. I test two competing propositions regarding the effect of repression using event data from the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 3.0) from 1990 to 2012. The results show that repression, specifically physical repression, of non-violent opposition reduces participation size. Non-physical repression, on the other hand, has less of a deterrence effect on non-violent dissident mobilization.

本文研究了镇压对非暴力与动员群众动员的条件效应。尽管政府经常诉诸暴力来阻止未来的动员，但对镇压异议关系的研究在镇压效果方面产生了分歧的证据。许多人认为，镇压往往会事与愿违，而另一些人则表现出其在减少动员方面的有效性。我认为，镇压的效果因反对派策略的不同而不同。我使用1990年至2012年的非暴力和暴力运动与结果数据集（NAVCO 3.0）中的事件数据测试了两个关于压制效果的竞争命题。结果表明，非暴力反对派的压制，尤其是身体压制，会减少参与尺寸。另一方面，非身体压抑