We examine how a voluntary participation decision in international environmental negotiations affects the endogenous authority structure in a federation. In our model, the federal government of each country decides whether to delegate both the decision to participate in a negotiation that determines the abatement level of pollution (the level of the public good), and the negotiation itself, to a regional government of the polluter region. We show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which none of the federal governments chooses delegation, which is quite different from the authority structure in the absence of a voluntary participation decision. The main contribution is to explain why the federal government has an incentive not to delegate decisions to a regional government

我们研究了国际环境谈判中的自愿参与决定如何影响联邦的内生权威结构。在我们的模型中，每个国家的联邦政府都决定是否将参与参与决定减排水平（公共产品水平）的谈判的决定以及谈判本身委托给污染者的地区政府地区。我们证明存在一个子博弈的完美均衡，其中没有一个联邦政府选择授权，这与在没有自愿参与决定的情况下的权力结构大不相同。主要贡献在于解释为什么联邦政府有动力不将决定权下放给地方政府