This article examines the political and economic dynamics of welfare markets in the USA. These marketplaces differ from other public–private welfare arrangements in that the state crafts and sustains these markets with the aim of using competition to promote cost-effective welfare provision. However, welfare markets face fundamental tensions between competition and stability that we trace to the allocation of risk between the state and private providers. Faced with the prospect of bearing potential losses, private firms often deploy instruments to reduce risk, lobby for risk protections from policymakers, or threaten to exit the market. The result is markets that are either non-competitive but stable, or competitive but unstable. In short, when policymakers create welfare markets they are riding a tiger, making themselves vulnerable to the functioning of markets over which they have imperfect control. We theorize and illustrate these dynamics through analyses of mortgage securitization, Medicare Advantage markets and the Obamacare health exchanges. This article contributes to the study of the US welfare state, speaks to the perils of marketized welfare in rich democracies and shows how market reforms can lead to unexpected state expansion.

中文翻译：

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骑虎难下：管理美国住房金融和健康保险福利市场的风险

本文研究了美国福利市场的政治和经济动态。这些市场与其他公共-私人福利安排不同，因为国家建立并维持了这些市场，目的是利用竞争来促进具有成本效益的福利提供。但是，福利市场在竞争与稳定之间面临着根本性的紧张关系，我们可以追溯到国家与私人提供者之间的风险分配。面对潜在损失的可能性，私营公司经常部署工具以降低风险，游说政策制定者提供风险保护或威胁退出市场。结果是市场要么没有竞争力，要么稳定，要么竞争却不稳定。简而言之，当政策制定者建立福利市场时，他们就是在骑虎，使自己容易受到市场控制不足的市场的影响。我们通过分析抵押贷款证券化，Medicare Advantage市场和Obamacare健康交易所来理论化并说明这些动态。本文为美国福利国家的研究做出了贡献，谈到了富裕民主国家中市场化福利的风险，并展示了市场改革如何导致意外的州扩张。