This paper defends the possibility of admitting occurrents in a presentist ontology. Two ways of doing so are proposed, the first one involves Meinongian presentism. By using the notion of non-existent object and coherently modifying some mereological principle, it is argued, the presentist can allow for occurrents. The second proposal involves ex-concrete objects. Ex-concrete objects, i.e. objects that are contingently not concrete, have been used by Linsky and Zalta (Philosophical Perspectives, 8 (Logic and Language), 431-458, 1994), Williamson (2002) in the modal metaphysics debate, by Orilia (Philosophical Studies, 173 (3), 589-607, 2016) in the presentism-eternalism debate, and by Longenecker (Synthese 195 (11), 5091-5111, 2018) in the debate about material constitution. I argue that, just by admitting ex-concrete objects, it is possible to have occurrents even for the presentist. Of course, in order to do so we must modify our definitions of occurrent and continuant. Nevertheless, I argue that my theory is metaphysically sound, at least for the presentist persuaded by the intuitive claim that there are occurrents, which otherwise she must reject.

本文捍卫了承认存在本体论中出现者的可能性。提出了两种这样做的方法，第一种涉及美浓的当下主义。有人认为，通过使用不存在的客体的概念并连贯地修改某些论理原则，当事者可以允许出现的事件发生。第二个建议涉及具体的对象。Linsky和Zalta（哲学观点，8（逻辑和语言），431-458，1994），Williamson（2002）在模式形而上学辩论中，Orilia使用过混凝土的物体，也就是非偶然的物体。 （Philosophical Studies，173（3），589-607，2016）在当下主义-永恒主义辩论中，以及Longenecker（Synthese 195（11），5091-5111，2018）在关于物质构成的辩论中。我认为，仅仅通过接受具体的对象，甚至对于演讲者来说，都有可能发生。当然，为了做到这一点，我们必须修改对出现和连续的定义。但是，我认为我的理论是形而上学的，至少对于表现主义者来说，至少有直觉的说法说服了存在者，否则她必须拒绝。