We investigate how to regulate a potentially corruptible certifier considering a situation in which a short-lived firm can acquire a quality label from a long-lived certifier. Such a label can be acquired by investing in quality or bribing the certifier. The unregulated certifier behaves honestly only when the discount factor is sufficiently high, while for lower discount factors, maximizes the size of a bribe by setting the quality standard at maximum. With careful regulation of labeling fee and quality standard, the regulator can reduce corruption, increasing sustainability of the certification market. When a partial certifier capture occurs in equilibrium, a trade-off between static and dynamic social surplus may arise. Maximizing static social surplus without considering the sustainability of the certification market may lead to lower dynamic surplus. In a capture-proof equilibrium, the optimally regulated fee is higher than the inspection cost and the optimally regulated standard is below its unconstrained-by-capture-concerns level. The fee may be increased and the standard reduced as deterring capture becomes more difficult due to a lower discount factor.

考虑到短期企业可以从长期认证者那里获得质量标签的情况，我们研究了如何监管潜在腐败的认证者。可以通过投资质量或贿赂证明人来获得这种标签。只有当折现率足够高时，不受监管的证明人才能诚实行事，而对于较低的折现率，则通过将质量标准设置为最大来使贿赂的规模最大化。通过仔细监管标签费和质量标准，监管机构可以减少腐败，提高认证市场的可持续性。当部分证明者获得平衡时，可能会在静态和动态的社会剩余之间进行权衡。在不考虑认证市场可持续性的情况下最大化静态社会剩余可能导致较低的动态剩余。在防捕获均衡中，最佳监管费用高于检查成本，并且最佳监管标准低于其不受捕获问题约束的水平。由于折扣率较低，阻止捕获变得更加困难，因此可能会增加费用并降低标准。