Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.

由于逻辑认识论的传统解释的弱点，最近人们对这种被称为“反例外主义的逻辑”（AEL）的观点给予了相当大的关注，即逻辑的主题和认识论可能与公认的科学没有太大不同。 。AEL的拥护者提出的最普遍的主张之一是，逻辑内的理论选择与科学内的理论选择非常相似。与科学方法论的联系凸显了反例外论者面临的巨大挑战，因为关于科学理论的两个无争议主张是，它们试图解释目标现象，并（至少部分地）通过成功的预测证明其价值。因此，如果要使这种方法学上的AEL可行，反例外主义者将需要合理地考虑逻辑试图解释哪些现象，它们如何解释以及可以说它们在什么意义上发出了预测。本文通过对逻辑理论的选择进行了新的解释，即反逻辑主义的建议，即逻辑预测主义，根据该逻辑，逻辑既参与了预测过程，又参与了解释过程。