In the present paper we model the Navya-Nyāya analysis of Vedic and secular injunctions and prohibitions by means of Giordani’s and Canavotto’s system ADL (“Action Deontic Logic”) of dynamic deontic logic. Navya-Naiyāyikas analyze the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions by reducing them to plain indicative statements about certain properties whose presence or absence in the enjoined or prohibited action serves as a criterion for the truth or falsity of the “inducing” or “restraining knowledge”, a kind of qualificative cognition instilled in the recipient of an injunction or prohibition. Thus, Navya-Naiyāyikas have found their own way to solve Jørgensen’s Puzzle concerning the very idea of a deontic logic as a tool to analyze arguments based on sentences which do not seem to be truth-apt. The teleological aspect of the Navya-Nyāya characterization of an enjoined or prohibited action can also give a clue to solutions of other puzzles and paradoxes which have beset the development of deontic logic in the West. A specific contrary-to-duty puzzle from the Indian tradition is related to the śyena, a malefic sacrifice meant for harming one’s enemy. The Vedic injunction to perform such a sacrifice runs counter to a religious practitioner’s duty not to harm a living being. In the present paper we examine the cogency of the very different solutions to this dilemma suggested by the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara on the one hand and the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa on the other hand.

在本文中，我们通过佐丹尼和Canavotto的系统ADL建模了Vedic和世俗禁令和禁令的Navya-Nyaya分析（“行动Deontic逻辑”）。Navya-Naiyāyikas通过将禁令和禁令的含义简化为对某些财产的明确指示性陈述，来分析禁令和禁令的含义，这些财产的存在或不存在构成了“诱使”或“限制知识”的真实性或虚假性的标准，一种向禁令或禁令的接受者灌输的定性认知。因此，Navya-Naiyāyikas找到了自己的方式来解决约根森的《难题》，该难题涉及将宗法逻辑作为一种工具来分析基于似乎不切合实际的句子的论点的工具。指示行动或被禁止行动的Navya-Nyāya表征的目的论方面，也可以为解决困扰西方宗法逻辑发展的其他难题和悖论提供线索。来自印度传统的一个特定的反义务难题与śyena，旨在伤害敌人的邪恶牺牲。吠陀禁令执行这种牺牲与宗教从业者不损害生物的责任背道而驰。在本文中，我们研究了一方面由米拉萨卡·普拉布哈卡拉（MīmāṃsakaPrabhākara）和另一方面由纳维娅·奈亚伊卡·加格塞斯（Nava-NaiyāyikaGaṅgeśa）提出的解决这一困境的完全不同的解决方案。