In this paper, I shall apply the idea of ‘moral relativism’ in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The concept of ‘moral relativism’ has been closely related to postmodernism, and in particular proponents of Aristotlian reject Nietzsche’s kind of relativism, yet the issues remained part of Nietzsche’s philosophy and prominently situated in his philosophical works. Nietzsche talks about morality as antinature, he thinks that how morality is repressive ‘relative’ to what we might concern as the unbridled manifestation of wants and needs and appetites. In his famous publications of Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), Nietzsche argues intensively and effectively about morality, his thought undoubtedly has a pronounced relativistic tendencies. Moral values are not universal and absolute, but are therefore conditional constructions of particular group at particular times with particular goals. Nietzsche speaks in the “interpretation” or “perspective” regarding morality or values in particular. According to Nietzsche, no one kind of morality is correct and neither is incorrect nor unacceptable for everyone; it should be noted that Nietzsche considers that each is correct for one type of person and incorrect for others. This makes it possible for Nietzsche to take a more important level on moral relativism.

在本文中，我将把“道德相对主义”的思想运用到弗里德里希·尼采的哲学中。“道德相对主义”的概念与后现代主义密切相关，特别是亚里士多德的拥护者拒绝尼采的相对主义，但这些问题仍然是尼采哲学的一部分，并突出地存在于他的哲学著作中。尼采谈到道德是反自然，他认为道德如何压制“相对于”我们可能关心的，作为欲望，需求和食欲的无休止的表现的“相对”。在他的著名著作《善与恶之外》（1886年）和《道德家谱》中尼采（1887）对道德进行了深入而有效的争论，他的思想无疑具有明显的相对论倾向。道德价值观不是普遍的和绝对的，而是在特定时间以特定目标对特定群体的条件建构。尼采特别是在道德或价值观念的“解释”或“观点”上发言。尼采认为，没有一种道德是正确的，也不是不正确的，也不是每个人都不能接受的。应该指出的是，尼采认为每种对一种人都是正确的，而对另一种人是不正确的。这使尼采在道德相对主义上走上了更重要的台阶。