We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.

我们表明，如果在检验的假设中真实假设的数量不等于错误假设的数量，那么检验假设的内曼-皮尔森理论就不能保证最小的认识论可靠性（更倾向于得出正确结论而不是得出错误结论的特征）那些）。我们还认为，NP不能避免实用价值不均的错误概率设置对N-P的认知可靠性可能产生的负面影响。最重要的是，我们认为，在产生负面影响的情况下，无法进行任何方法上的调整来抵消它，因此在这种情况下，所讨论的NP的实用价值负载不可避免地会损害实现真理的目标。