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Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction
Synthese ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-19 , DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03107-6
Hsueh Qu

This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the focus on the paper is on Kant’s identification of the form that a solution to Hume’s inductive scepticism must take. In making this point, my paper will look to establish two lemmas: (1) Kant identifies synthetic a priori judgments as a means of justifying metaphysical knowledge in a way that circumvents Hume’s dichotomy between matters of fact and relations of ideas; (2) the Second Analogy looks to establish the uniformity of nature of as a synthetic a priori proposition. However, my paper generally abstains from the question of the tenability of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. Doing justice to this latter discussion would require more space than I am able to offer here. My paper therefore has a conditional bearing on the philosophical issue of inductive scepticism. If one believes Kant’s Second Analogy to be philosophically cogent, then Kant offers a successful justification of induction against Hume’s scepticism. If not, then at least one can still admire Kant’s identification of the gap in Hume’s argument, which, to a degree, can be exploited independently of Kant’s system.



中文翻译:

综合先验判断和康德对休ume的归纳反应

本文将使我们可以在康德的第二类比中找到对休ume关于归纳论证的实质性回应的情况。这种回应是实质性的,因为它不仅在于独立地争论相反的结论,而且在于它找出并利用了这一论点中的空白。更具体地说,休ume(Hume)错过了证明自然统一性作为合成先验命题的可能性的可能性,这是康德(Kant)在第二个类比法中试图确立的。请注意,本文的重点是康德对休ume归纳怀疑论的解决方案必须采用的形式的识别。在提出这一点时,我的论文将寻求建立两个引理:(1)康德(Kant)将综合先验判断确定为证明形而上学知识的一种手段,从而以某种方式规避了休ume在事实与观念关系之间的二分法;(2)第二类比法旨在确立作为先验命题的综合性质的统一性。但是,我的论文通常对第二类比中康德论点的可持久性问题持弃权态度。要为后面的讨论伸张正义,将需要比我在这里能够提供的更多的空间。因此,我的论文对归纳怀疑论的哲学问题有条件的影响。如果有人认为康德的第二类比在哲学上是有说服力的,那么康德就可以成功地归纳出休against的怀疑论。如果不是这样,那么至少有一个人仍然可以欣赏康德对休ume论证中的差距的认同,即,

更新日期:2021-03-19
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