This paper analyzes the effects of bank capital regulation on the link between bank size and volatility. Using bank-level data for 27 advanced economies over the 2000–2014 period, we estimate a power law that relates the volume of a bank’s loan portfolio to the volatility of loan growth. Our analysis reveals, first, that more stringent capital regulation weakens the size-volatility nexus. Hence, in countries with more stringent capital regulation, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Second, the effect of tighter capital requirements on the size-volatility nexus becomes stronger for the upper tail of the bank size distribution. This is in line with capitalization decreasing with bank size, such that larger banks tend to be more affected by increasing capital requirements. Third, in countries with higher sectoral capital buffers, the size-volatility nexus is weaker.

本文分析了银行资本监管对银行规模与波动性之间联系的影响。利用2000-2014年期间27个发达经济体的银行水平数据，我们估算了幂定律，该幂定律将银行贷款组合的数量与贷款增长的波动性联系起来。我们的分析表明，首先，更严格的资本监管削弱了规模波动性联系。因此，在资本管制更为严格的国家中，大型银行证明，资本异议是必不可少的。，降低贷款组合的波动性。其次，对于银行规模分布的上尾，更严格的资本要求对规模-波动关系的影响变得更强。这与资本规模随着银行规模的减少而减少是一致的，因此大型银行往往会受到资本需求增加的更大影响。第三，在具有较高部门资本缓冲的国家中，规模波动性联系较弱。