This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015), 1711–1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs; we show that rule breaking occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend the model by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we show that a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low degrees of present bias.

中文翻译：

---

时间不一致的选民违反了公共债务规则

本研究考虑了在可能违反债务规则的情况下，当前偏好偏好如何影响公共债务政策。为了解决这个问题，该研究扩展了 Bisin、Lizzeri 和 Yariv（美国经济评论 105，（2015），1711-1737）的框架，允许以额外成本打破规则；我们表明，当一个国家表现出强烈的当前偏见时，就会发生规则破坏。我们通过引入确定债务规则的政治过程进一步扩展了模型，并且我们表明，在当前偏见程度高和低的国家之间出现了债务规则的两极分化。