According to moral error theory, there are no ethical facts. Error theorists often defend this view with the metaphysical argument from queerness. This argument purports to show that it is most reasonable to believe that ethical facts do not exist, because such facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant. This paper argues that even if we assume that ethical facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant, the argument from queerness does not warrant the rejection of ethical facts. It only shows that it is most reasonable to refrain from believing that ethical facts exist. The argument from queerness therefore merely supports metaethical scepticism: that is, it merely supports agnosticism about the existence of ethical facts. This is cause for optimism, because metaethical scepticism is less of a threat to our moral practice than moral error theory.

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从酷儿中揭穿争论

根据道德错误理论，不存在道德事实。错误理论家经常用来自酷儿的形而上学论证来捍卫这一观点。这一论点旨在表明，相信伦理事实不存在是最合理的，因为这些事实在形而上学上是奇怪的，并且在解释上是多余的。本文认为，即使我们假设伦理事实在形而上学上是奇怪的并且在解释上是多余的，来自酷儿的论点并不能保证拒绝伦理事实。它只表明不相信道德事实存在是最合理的。因此，来自酷儿的论点仅支持元伦理怀疑论：也就是说，它仅支持关于伦理事实存在的不可知论。这是乐观的原因，