A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental in respective field. The two notions might seem incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular, I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory claims since the practices of moral blame and rational criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification, response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than standardly presumed in metaethics.

中文翻译：

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道德责备与理性批评

实践哲学的一个核心问题是道德责任与规范理由之间的关系。由于原因之争和罪责之争之间几乎没有直接交流，这个话题并没有得到应有的重视。在本文中，我考虑了两个关于可责备性和原因的概念，它们在各自的领域中都很重要。这两个概念在单独考虑时似乎无可争议，但我认为它们合在一起需要高度争议的主张。特别是，我认为它们包含不合理和矛盾的主张，因为道德责备和理性批评的实践在三个维度上存在分歧：正当性、回应和功能。因此，我们需要放弃其中一个主要概念。