Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

中文翻译：

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作为共时史的哲学

伯纳德·威廉姆斯认为哲学在某种程度上类似于历史。这篇文章是对威廉姆斯论文（我称之为）的新颖探索和辩护——尽管在某种程度上让威廉姆斯本人感到厌恶。关键思想是将 1960 年代有时被称为分析历史哲学的核心道德应用于今天的哲学哲学，即解释与法律的分离。我建议对大卫·刘易斯提供的因果解释进行修改，以指出这种道德适用于哲学的方式，从而捍卫威廉姆斯的论点。我详细讨论了该论文对哲学进步问题的影响，并指出了一些进一步的影响：对于当代元哲学的更大背景，对于哲学与其他学科的关系，