This article deals with the self-insider, i. e. the possible creation of the inside information by a person and its (abusive) exploitation. It describes the situation in Germany and in Italy and provides a taxonomy of the several cases of self-insider. The article then analyzes the case law of the ECJ and the MAR regulatory provisions for justifying/neglecting the existence of the self-insider (Article 9.5 and 9.6 MAR). Given the unclear regulatory answer regarding its sanctionability, the article proposes, based on the economics of MAR, a law and economics reason of why the self-insider sometime should be sanctioned, by describing it as a peculiar monopolistic behavior able to distort investors’ confidence and market integrity. Finally, the article suggests that the European legislator should explicitly deal with the problem.

中文翻译：

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关于自我约束和市场滥用监管的一些思考–作为垄断方内部人的自我约束

本文涉及自我内幕，即人可能创建内部信息及其（滥用）利用。它描述了德国和意大利的情况，并提供了几种关于自我检查的案例的分类法。然后，文章分析了欧洲法院的判例法和MAR的监管规定，以证明/忽略自我内幕人的存在（MAR的第9.5和9.6条）。鉴于监管机构对制裁的制裁性尚无明确答案，本文根据MAR的经济学原理，提出了为什么应自我制裁某人的内部法律和经济学理由，将其描述为一种能够扭曲投资者信心的特殊的垄断行为。和市场诚信。最后，文章建议欧洲立法者应明确处理该问题。