Bureaucratic performance varies immensely even within low-capacity states. Politicians and bureaucrats create pockets or networks of effectiveness that allow some departments to perform more efficiently than others. How do these networks develop and how are politicized bureaucratic appointments used to influence performance? Drawing on qualitative fieldwork conducted in Punjab, Pakistan, this paper argues that politicians and bureaucrats ensure enhanced performance by making legal and extra-legal appointments of hand-picked bureaucrats to key posts. The choice of bureaucrat is made on the basis of carefully curated relationships of patronage established through work, training, and old school networks. As a result, temporary networks of effectiveness are created but rendered unsustainable by the very patronage relationships that create them, preventing them from evolving into more permanent pockets of effectiveness. More broadly, my argument contributes to debates on intra-state capacity and politicization, establishing a link between patterns of staffing and patterns of governance.

即使在低容量状态下，官僚机构的表现也会发生巨大变化。政客和官僚们创造了财大气粗的网络，使某些部门的工作效率比其他部门更高。这些网络如何发展？政治化的官僚任命如何影响绩效？本文利用在巴基斯坦旁遮普邦进行的定性实地考察，认为政治家和官僚通过任命精选的官僚为重要职位进行法律和法律以外的任命，从而确保了绩效的提高。官僚的选择是基于通过工作，培训和旧学校网络建立的精心设计的顾客关系。结果，创建了临时的有效性网络，但由于建立它们的光顾关系而变得难以为继，阻止它们演变成更永久的效力。更广泛地说，我的论点促进了关于国家内部能力和政治化的辩论，在人员配备模式和治理模式之间建立了联系。