Goldman proposed that a subject knows if and only if is appropriately causally connected to 's believing . He later on abandoned this theory. The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that the modified theory leads to the correct results in contexts involving other prominent forms of epistemic luck and compare it with other accounts on the market.

中文翻译：

---

重新审视知识的因果理论：一种干预主义方法

戈德曼提出，主体知道当且仅当与“相信”有适当的因果关系。后来他放弃了这个理论。对该理论的主要反对意见是，高盛要求的因果关系与某些有问题的运气形式相容。在本文中，我们认为，如果按照干预主义的路线来理解因果关系，戈德曼的知识因果理论可以克服运气问题。我们还表明，修改后的理论在涉及其他重要认知运气形式的上下文中会导致正确的结果，并将其与市场上的其他账户进行比较。