Scholars of epistemology have identified two conceptions of epistemic injustice: discriminatory epistemic injustice and distributive epistemic injustice. The former refers to wrongs to one’s capacity as a knower that are the result of identity prejudice. The latter refers to violations of one’s right to know what one is entitled to know. This essay advances a third conception, formative epistemic injustice, which refers to wrongs to one’s capacity as a knower that are the result of or result in malformation—the undue restriction of one’s formative capacities. The author argues that formative epistemic injustice is a distinctly educational wrong and that it brings to light important epistemic injustices that standard accounts of epistemic injustice either downplay or are unable to capture. This third conception of epistemic injustice is an important analytic tool for theorizing both epistemic injustice and educational justice.

认识论学者确定了两种认识论不公正的概念：歧视性认识论不公正和分配性认识论不公正。前者将身份偏见的结果称为对一个人作为知识者的能力的错误。后者是指侵犯一个人有权知道什么的知情权。本文提出了第三个概念，即形成性的认知不公正，它指的是由于畸形（一个人的形成能力受到不适当的限制）而导致的作为一个知识者的能力上的错误。作者认为，形成性的认识上的不公正是一个明显的教育错误，它揭示了重要的认识上的不公正，即对认识上的不公正的标准解释是淡化或无法捕捉。