This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections.

本文研究了标准公司合同（即公司法所规定的标准合同形式）所构想的公允价值保护对企业家与风险资本家之间的关系，特别是对不可避免的破坏价值的贸易销售的影响。首先，它表明典型的企业家－风险资本家合同确实使风险资本家的流动性需求制度化，在某些情况下允许违背合同的价值破坏实例。不可避免的破坏价值的贸易销售是最明显的例子。其次，它认为，公允价值保护可以阻止企业家和风险资本家按需分配这些交易产生的价值。然后，它表明，由风险资本支持的公司的现实要求对标准公司合同进行调整，这是取消或重新塑造公允价值保护措施的重要一步。最后，它认为旨在通过风险资本促进社会福利的标准公司合同应具有灵活的公允价值保护。