The decision to employ nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is arguably one of the most thoroughly investigated subjects in American history. Notably revisionist historians have repeatedly faulted the Truman administration for too easily discarding alternative options, arguing that a simple guarantee to retain the Japanese Emperor would have sufficed to make the Japanese government lay down arms almost immediately. In contrast to that position, the present article, however, maintains that American authorities did indeed have legitimate grounds not to expect that such concessions would in any way lead to a swift conclusion of the Pacific War, particularly since regardless of the Emperor issue there still remained the question of the appropriate moment and manner in which to exact a full surrender from the Imperial Army itself by decisively breaking its considerable military and political clout.

1945年8月在广岛和长崎使用核武器的决定可以说是美国历史上研究最彻底的问题之一。值得注意的是，修正主义历史学家一再指责杜鲁门政府过于轻易放弃其他选择，认为保留日本天皇的简单保证足以使日本政府几乎立即放下武器。与该立场相反，本条坚持认为，美国当局确实确实有正当理由不希望这种让步以任何方式能够导致太平洋战争的迅速结束，