In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy of mathematics.

在本文中，我认为，相反的是几个著名学者论确定性声称，维特根斯坦没有维护简单的数学命题，如“2×2 = 4”或“12×12 = 144，”就像GE摩尔的老生常谈，可能是铰链命题的例子。特别是，考虑到他的整体数学概念，他不可能从其余的数学陈述中挑出这些较简单的数学命题，而只为它们保留一个规范函数。然后，我坚持认为这些数学示例只是作为比较对象引入的，以展现他在《确定性》中所提及的唯一铰链的一些特殊特征。，这些都不在数学领域之内。最后，我以打手势为中心，探讨如何体现数学铰链和非铰链之间的区别，并探讨其对（维特根斯坦）数学哲学的影响。