This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.

中文翻译：

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怀疑与自我支配

本文涉及两个问题。Sextus Empiricus所描述的怀疑论者是否有脱离自己的感觉？这种自我分离本身是否会使怀疑论者的生活方式变得不受欢迎？我勾勒出两个自我超脱的概念，然后得出结论：怀疑论者面临一个难题：要么他比非怀疑者更容易脱离自己，要么他容易受到非标准性失用症候群的伤害。