In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that (i) is sufficient to undermine the prospect described in (ii). By contrast (and second), ordinary forms of skepticism, which can be identified in connection with (ii), can actually be a boon to inquiry by enhancing (iii). In such cases, having reasons for skeptical doubt is not merely compatible with inquiring further, but also serves to motivate and to help frame such inquiry.

在本文中，我对怀疑主义对进一步调查的下游影响感兴趣。为了说明这些下游影响，我们需要区分（i）怀疑p的（怀疑论依据）原因，（ii）基于进一步研究会改善一个人对p的认知地位的前景的其他背景信念，以及（ iii）为确定p是否赋值为1的值。对于怀疑主义对询问的下游影响，我提出了两个主张。首先，“激进”形式的怀疑主义的特征是：（i）足以破坏（ii）中所述的前景。相比之下（和第二点），可以与（ii）一起确定的普通怀疑论形式实际上可以通过增强（iii）来进行质疑。在这种情况下，有怀疑的理由不仅与进一步询问兼容，