In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the results of modern science. For example, how might the skeptic sustain suspension of judgment in light of overwhelming evidence for climate change? Or even atomic theory? Ultimately, Bett concludes that such claims within the natural sciences preclude us from living as Pyrrhonists today. In the following paper I argue, how it is possible for the Pyrrhonian skeptic to suspend judgment on certain well-confirmed scientific theories, how the skeptic does so in accord with rational norms, and in turn, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is possible as a way of life today.

在他最近的著作《如何成为皮浪主义者：皮浪主义怀疑论的实践和意义》的最后一章中，理查德·贝特讨论了今天作为皮浪主义怀疑论者生活的可能性。他关注的主要问题是怀疑论者中止判断的范围，以及怀疑论者是否可以根据现代科学的结果保持中止判断。例如，鉴于气候变化的压倒性证据，怀疑论者如何维持判断的暂停？甚至原子理论？最终，贝特得出结论，自然科学中的此类主张使我们无法像今天的皮浪主义者一样生活。在接下来的论文中，我论证了皮浪主义怀疑论者如何可能对某些已得到充分证实的科学理论暂停判断，怀疑论者如何根据理性规范这样做，反过来，皮浪主义怀疑论作为一种方式是可能的今天的生活。