Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share a common background? If so, is the rational resolution of their disagreement logically possible? What rational means can common sense use to convince someone of the privileged status of an epistemic principle? Relying on Reid’s, Alston’s and Lynch’s arguments, I show that common sense epistemology is a more promising approach than hinge epistemology, because it is driven by an optimism about reason in the solving of deep epistemic disagreements.

考虑到常识哲学家和怀疑论者之间持续存在分歧，看来他们面临着深刻的认识论分歧。从维特根斯坦的《确定性》中盘点，人们普遍认为，深层次的认识分歧无法得到合理解决。从维特根斯坦继承而来的铰链认识论也被认为是理解常识认识论的启发之路。但是，常识哲学家和怀疑论者之间真的存在深刻的认识论分歧吗？难道不认为他们有共同的背景吗？如果是这样，合理地解决他们的分歧在逻辑上是可能的吗？常识可以使用什么理性的手段来使某人信服认知原则的特权地位？依靠里德，阿尔斯通和林奇的观点，我证明了常识认识论比铰链认识论是一种更有前途的方法，因为它是由对解决深层认识论分歧的理性乐观所推动的。