In ordinary circumstances in which we know there is a goldfinch on a branch in the garden, do we know that the thing on the branch isn’t stuffed? Austin’s methodology is perfectly compatible with holding both that we do and that we wouldn’t know it’s a goldfinch if we didn’t. Moreover, Austin’s methodology supports the claim that if we had no information whatsoever about whether it is stuffed, we wouldn’t know the thing on the branch is a goldfinch. Finally, Mark Kaplan’s claim that P is part of your evidence if and only if you know that P leaves him with good reason to agree that in ordinary circumstances, you do know that the goldfinch isn’t stuffed. This result suggests a distinctive way of approaching arguments for external world skepticism with the structure of the so-called Argument from Ignorance. And it highlights just how much can be learned from approaching epistemological issues in an Austinian spirit.

一般情况下，我们知道花园里的树枝上有一只金翅雀，我们知道树枝上的东西没有塞吗？奥斯汀的方法论完美地兼容了我们所做的和如果我们不这样做我们就不会知道它是金翅雀的观点。此外，奥斯汀的方法论支持这样一种说法，即如果我们没有任何关于它是否被塞满的信息，我们就不会知道树枝上的东西是金翅雀。最后，马克·卡普兰声称 P 是你证据的一部分当且仅当你知道 P 让他有充分的理由同意在一般情况下，你确实知道金翅雀没有被塞满。这一结果表明了一种独特的方式来处理外部世界怀疑论的论证，这种方式具有所谓的无知论证的结构。