This paper discusses Austin’s goldfinch example from “Other Minds,” which plays a central role in Kaplan’s Austin’s Way with Skepticism. The paper aims to clarify the obscure distinction Austin makes in connection with this example, between cases in which we know and can prove and cases in which we know but can’t prove. By discussing a couple of remarks that Austin makes in passing, a view is extracted from his text that stands in conflict with Kaplan’s reading at a fundamental point. The view proposed emphasizes the role of law-like generics in our practice of knowledge attribution, and brings out the disjunctivist elements in Austin’s conception. It is argued that the response to skepticism that Kaplan ascribes to Austin is not fully satisfactory, since it fails to tell us what makes some challenges to our knowledge claims appropriate and others outrageous. The alternative view proposed in this paper can handle this problem without postulating the sort of general external criterion that Kaplan’s Austin rightly rejects.

本文讨论了奥斯汀在“其他思想”中的金翅雀示例，该示例在卡普兰的奥斯汀怀疑论中起着核心作用. 这篇论文旨在澄清奥斯汀在这个例子中所做的模糊区分，在我们知道并且可以证明的案例和我们知道但不能证明的案例之间。通过讨论奥斯汀顺带发表的一些评论，从他的文本中提取了一个观点，该观点与卡普兰的阅读在根本点上存在冲突。所提出的观点强调了类律类属在我们知识归属实践中的作用，并引出了奥斯汀概念中的析取主义成分。有人认为，卡普兰归咎于奥斯汀的对怀疑论的回应并不完全令人满意，因为它没有告诉我们是什么让对我们的知识主张的一些挑战是适当的，而另一些则是令人发指的。