The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence indicates progress in a field, then there is little progress in philosophy. This sceptical conclusion, however, need not make us give up philosophizing: That we should currently be sceptical of our philosophical beliefs is a contingent fact. We are an intellectually immature species and given the existence of the deep future we have some reason to think that there will be truth-convergence in philosophy in the future.

认识论的认识论探讨了一个问题，即一个代理人应该如何回应关于其同一个信念的认知同伴分歧的认识。具有讽刺意味的是，有关该主题的文献代表了关于我们应如何应对分歧的广泛分歧。我主张一个令人怀疑的结论，即在整个哲学史上一直存在着广泛的分歧，直到今天，这种分歧都表明，哲学家对得出真相非常不可靠。如果真相趋同表明一个领域的进步，那么哲学就没有什么进展。但是，这个怀疑的结论并不需要使我们放弃哲学上的思考：我们目前应该对我们的哲学信仰持怀疑态度是一个偶然的事实。