This paper discusses the juridical interpretation of Hobbes’s state of nature argument, which has been defended by commentators such as Georg Geismann, Dieter Hüning or Peter Schröder. According to the juridical interpretation, the primary reason why the Hobbesian state of nature needs to be abandoned is not that everybody’s self-preservation is constantly threatened. It is that, due to the universal right to all things, the jural order of the state of nature includes some kind of logical contradiction. The purpose of the paper is to show that the juridical interpretation does not do justice to Hobbes’s actual argument and that it starts from a false presupposition: being a Hohfeldian ‘liberty-right’, the right to all things can consistently be granted to all individuals at the same time.

本文讨论了霍布斯自然状态论证的司法解释，该论证得到了格奥尔格·盖伊斯曼，迪特·胡宁或彼得·施罗德等评论家的辩护。根据法律解释，需要放弃霍布斯自然状态的主要原因不是每个人的自我保护都在不断受到威胁。正是由于万物的普遍权利，自然状态的法律秩序包括某种逻辑上的矛盾。本文的目的是表明司法解释对霍布斯的实际论点没有公义，而且它以错误的预设为出发点：作为霍赫菲尔德主义的“自由权利”，万物的权利可以一贯地授予所有个人同时。