A popular stance amongst philosophers is one according to which, in Lewis’ words, “identity is utterly simple and unproblematic”. Building from Lewis’ famous passage on the matter, we reconstruct, and then criticize, an argument to the conclusion that identities cannot be grounded. With the help of relatively uncontroversial assumption concerning identity facts, we show that not all identities are equi-fundamental, and, on the contrary, some appear to be provided potential grounding bases using two-level identity criteria. Further potential grounding bases for identities are presented. Identity might be utterly simple and unproblematic, but this is not sufficient to conclude that identities are ungrounded, or fundamental.

在哲学家中，一种流行的态度是，用刘易斯的话说，“身份完全简单而没有问题”。我们以刘易斯对此事的著名论述为基础，重建并批评一个论断，即不能认同身份这一结论。在关于身份事实的相对无争议的假设的帮助下，我们表明并非所有身份都是平等的，相反，使用两级身份标准似乎为某些身份提供了潜在的基础。提出了进一步的潜在身份认同基础。身份可能完全简单且没有问题，但这不足以得出身份是没有根据或根本的结论。