The present article is the second part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In a subsequent paper that shall be published elsewere, additional illustrations of such traces will be provided, taken from a collection of classic texts in the philosophy of language, also from Frege onwards (Baghramian 1998). Then, the present paper is devoted to providing yet additional illustrations of those traces, but this time taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the subject: the book Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz in 2012. We shall, thus, describe a considerable number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the adhesion to pseudo-Platonism in the form of semantic mentalism; the typical limitations of avoidant and trivializing semantic accounts; the confinement to logico-philosophical analysis as the only methodology for semantic research; the excesses committed by some radical semantic anti-representationalists and some radical semantic biologists; and the adhesion to hardcore semantic Platonism itself.

本文是论文三部曲的第二部分，致力于分析语义柏拉图主义对当代语言哲学的影响。在第一部分（Picazo 2021）中，通过研究自弗雷格以来语义学中柏拉图主义的一些典型痕迹，开始了讨论。在随后将要发表的另一篇论文中，将提供这些痕迹的其他插图，这些插图也取自语言哲学的一系列经典文本，也来自弗雷格（Baghramian 1998）。然后，本文专门提供了这些痕迹的更多说明，但这一次取材于有关该主题的近期委托论文集：《意义的前途》（Prospects for Meaning）由Richard Schantz在2012年编辑。因此，我们将描述许多示例，在这些示例中可以感觉到语义柏拉图主义对这些论文的影响。这些例子中最突出的是以语义心理主义的形式对伪柏拉图主义的坚持。回避和琐碎语义描述的典型局限性；仅限于逻辑哲学分析作为语义研究的唯一方法；一些激进的语义反代表主义者和一些激进的语义生物学家所犯下的过分行为；以及对核心语义柏拉图主义本身的坚持。