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Ignorance, Knowledge, and Two Epistemic Intuitions
Philosophia ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s11406-021-00342-6
Pierre Le Morvan

One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of true belief) and supports the Standard View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of knowledge).



中文翻译:

无知,知识和两种认知直觉

认识论中最古老和持久的直觉之一是关于真实信念和知识之间的关系。它由苏格拉底(Socrates)著名地表达,认为真正的信念不足以提供知识。我讨论了一种关于无知的匹配直觉,根据这种直觉,真正的信念不足以消除无知。我认为,后一种直觉削弱了“无知的新观点”(根据这种无知是缺乏真正的信仰),并支持了“标准的无知”观点(根据无知是缺乏知识)。

更新日期:2021-03-17
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