This paper examines two objections to the infinitist theory of epistemic justification, namely “the finite mind objection” and “the distinction objection.” It criticizes Peter Klein’s response to the distinction objection and offers a more plausible response. It is then argued that this response is incompatible with Klein’s response to the finite mind objection. Infinitists, it would seem, cannot handle both objections when taken together.

中文翻译：

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无限主义者是否可以处理有限的异议和区分异议？

本文研究了对非限定性认识论称谓理论的两个反对意见，即“有限精神反对意见”和“区分反对意见”。它批评了彼得·克莱因（Peter Klein）对区别对待异议的回应，并提出了更为合理的回应。然后有人认为，这种回应与克莱因对有限思维异议的回应是不相容的。看起来无限极主义者在一起无法解决这两个反对意见。