The thesis that animals feel a morally relevant kind of pain is an incredibly popular one, but explaining the evidence for this belief is surprisingly challenging. Michael Murray has defended neo-Cartesianism, the view that animals may lack the ability to feel pain in a morally relevant sense. In this paper, I present the reasons for doubting that animals feel morally relevant pain. I then respond to critics of Murray’s position, arguing that the evidence proposed more recently is still largely unpersuasive. I end by considering the implications for moral discourse and praxis.

中文翻译：

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动物是否在道德相关意义上感到痛苦？

动物感受到一种与道德相关的痛苦的论点非常受欢迎，但解释这种信念的证据却出人意料地具有挑战性。迈克尔默里为新笛卡尔主义辩护，认为动物可能缺乏在道德相关意义上感受到疼痛的能力。在这篇论文中，我提出了怀疑动物会感受到与道德相关的痛苦的原因。然后我回应了对默里立场的批评，认为最近提出的证据在很大程度上仍然没有说服力。我最后考虑了对道德话语和实践的影响。