Chalmers (Mind, 125, 499–510, 2016), responding to Braun (Mind, 125, 469–497, 2016), continues arguments from Chalmers (Mind, 120, 587–636, 2011a) for the conclusion that Bayesian considerations favor the Fregean in the debate over the objects of belief in Frege’s puzzle. This short paper gets to the heart of the disagreement over whether Bayesian considerations can tell us anything about Frege’s puzzle and answers, no, they cannot.

中文翻译：

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贝叶斯主义能解决弗雷格的难题吗？

Chalmers (Mind, 125, 499-510, 2016)，回应 Braun (Mind, 125, 469-497, 2016)，继续 Chalmers (Mind, 120, 587-636, 2011a) 的论点，支持贝叶斯考虑弗雷格人在关于弗雷格谜题中信仰对象的辩论中。这篇简短的论文触及了关于贝叶斯考虑是否可以告诉我们有关弗雷格难题和答案的任何信息的分歧的核心，不，他们不能。