Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground . In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view that construction is ground that is endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider, and dispense with, different versions of the view that construction is ground, and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant ground-theoretic accounts of its relevance fail to capture it.

中文翻译：

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社会建设不是什么

正如当代形而上学一般以对基础的兴趣为标志，当代社会形而上学尤其以对社会建构的兴趣为标志。因此，毫不奇怪，一些当代形而上学家已经从基础的角度来理解社会建构。在本文中，我认为这是一个错误。尤其是，我认为，任何其他看似合理的将建筑作为基础的解释都是令人反感的修正。首先，我讨论了一个观点，即建筑是其支持者所认可的基础，并确定其弱点。然后，我考虑并摒弃了不同版本的构建是基础的观点，并认为这些要么过度概括，要么概括不足，或两者兼而有之。