Comte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte’s challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholtz on unconscious inferences and argued that we can resolve Comte’s problem by reformulating it in terms of the brain. Since the brain consists of different parts having different functions, it is possible that some parts are involved in observing (they unconsciously process information) while other parts integrate the received information resulting in conscious experiences to which we have access. Dehaene’s answer is criticized and the alternative neo-Aristotelian resolution of Comte’s challenge is discussed. Explanations of blindsight are used to illustrate the differences between the two responses to Comte’s challenge.

中文翻译：

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如何解决孔德的挑战：认知神经科学和新亚里士多德替代方案的答案

孔德反对笛卡尔的心灵概念，即思想家不能同时思考或感知和观察自己这样做。基于认知神经科学的见解，Dehaene 最近对 Comte 的挑战给出了当代答案。他在无意识推论上扩展了亥姆霍兹的一些观点，并认为我们可以通过用大脑重新表述孔德的问题来解决它。由于大脑由具有不同功能的不同部分组成，因此某些部分可能参与观察（它们无意识地处理信息），而其他部分则整合接收到的信息，从而产生我们可以访问的有意识体验。Dehaene 的回答受到批评，并讨论了对 Comte 挑战的替代性新亚里士多德解决方案。