David Armstrong (1983) argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the best explanation and even whether, by Armstrong’s own standards, necessitation relations offer a potential explanation of this explanandum, let alone the best explanation. I defend Armstrong against these particular criticisms. Firstly, even though there are reasons to think that Armstrong’s justification fails as a self-contained defence of induction, it can usefully complement several other answers to Hume. Secondly, I argue that Armstrong’s reasoning is consistent with his own standards for explanation.

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阿姆斯壮的普遍性可以为归纳做什么？

David Armstrong (1983) 认为共相之间的必然关系是对我们的一些观察的最好解释。如果我们因此将它们接受到我们的本体中，那么我们就可以证明归纳是正确的，因为这些必然关系也对未观察到的事物具有影响。通过接受阿姆斯壮的普遍性，我们可以证明我们最强大的认识论直觉并回答归纳问题。然而，阿姆斯特朗的推理最近受到了各种理由的质疑。批评者反对阿姆斯特朗对最佳解释的推理的使用，甚至反对阿姆斯特朗自己的标准，必然关系是否提供了对这种解释的潜在解释，更不用说最好的解释了。我为阿姆斯特朗辩护，反对这些特别的批评。首先，尽管有理由认为阿姆斯特朗的论证不能作为对归纳的独立辩护，但它可以有效地补充休谟的其他几个答案。其次，我认为阿姆斯特朗的推理与他自己的解释标准是一致的。