Recently, evidentialists have argued that only they can explain transparency--the psychological phenomena wherein the question of doxastic deliberation of whether to believe p immediately gives way to the question of whether p --and thus that pragmatism about epistemic reasons is false. In this paper, we provide a defense of pragmatism. We depart from previous defenses of pragmatism which argue against the evidentialist explanation of transparency or the fact of transparency itself, by instead arguing that the pragmatist can provide a sound explanation of transparency while maintaining her distinctive view of epistemic reasons. We do so by putting forth an evolutionary debunking explanation of doxastic deliberation. Since both the evidentialist and pragmatist have sound explanatory accounts of transparency, we argue that transparency should not be appealed to when trying to adjudicate the debate between evidentialists and pragmatists, but rather must be decided on other grounds.

中文翻译：

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认知原因、透明度和进化揭秘

最近，证据主义者争辩说，只有他们才能解释透明度——这种心理现象，在这种心理现象中，是否相信 p 的信念性审议问题立即让位于是否 p 的问题——因此，关于认识论理由的实用主义是错误的。在本文中，我们为实用主义辩护。我们与先前的实用主义辩护不同，后者反对对透明度的证据主义解释或透明度本身的事实，而是认为实用主义者可以提供对透明度的合理解释，同时保持她对认识论理由的独特看法。为此，我们提出了对信念深思熟虑的进化揭穿解释。由于证据主义者和实用主义者都对透明度有合理的解释，