We analyze how tariff design incentivizes households to invest in residential photovoltaic and battery storage systems, and explore selected electricity sector effects. To this end, we develop an open-source electricity sector model that explicitly features prosumage agents and apply it to German 2030 scenarios. Results show that lower feed-in tariffs substantially reduce investments in residential photovoltaics, yet optimal battery sizing and self-generation are relatively robust. With increasing fixed parts of retail tariffs and, accordingly, lower volumetric retail rates for grid consumption, households have lower incentives for self-consumption. As a consequence, optimal battery capacities and self-generation are smaller, and households contribute more to non-energy power sector costs. A cap on hourly feed-in by households may relieve distribution grid stress without compromising PV expansion or prosumage models for households. When choosing tariff designs, policy makers should not aim to (dis-)incentivize prosumage as such, but balance effects on renewable capacity expansion and system cost contribution.

我们分析电价设计如何激励家庭投资于住宅光伏和电池存储系统，并探索选定的电力部门影响。为此，我们开发了一个开放式电力部门模型，该模型明确地具有pro业业代理人的特征，并将其应用于德国2030年情景。结果表明，较低的上网电价会大大减少对家用光伏发电的投资，但最佳的电池尺寸和自发电能力相对较强。随着零售电价固定部分的增加，以及相应的电网消费量零售价格的降低，家庭对自我消费的动机也降低了。因此，最佳电池容量和自发电量较小，并且家庭对非能源电力部门的成本贡献更大。限制家庭每小时的供电量可以缓解配电网的压力，而不会影响家庭的PV扩展或付费模型。在选择资费设计时，政策制定者不应旨在以此来（消灭）专业消费，而是要平衡对可再生能源产能扩张和系统成本贡献的影响。