This article proposes a new auction design for the efficient allocation of pollution permits. We show that if the auctioneer restricts the bidding rule of the uniform-price auction—coupled with a simple ex-post supply adjustment rule—then truthful bidding is obtained. Consequently, the uniform-price auction is more allocatively efficient than conventional formats that are currently observed in pollution markets.

中文翻译：

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分配有效的污染许可证拍卖

本文提出了一种新的拍卖设计，以有效分配污染许可证。我们证明，如果拍卖师限制统一价格拍卖的出价规则，再加上简单的事后供给调整规则，则可以得到真实的出价。因此，统一价格拍卖比污染市场上目前观察到的传统形式更具分配效率。