This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.

中文翻译：

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不依赖指导：管理预测中的反信号

这项研究提出了一个新颖的程式化事实，并提供了解释：既有表现出色的公司，也有陷入困境的公司都拒绝发布收益指导。我们假设经理的能力会影响收入水平和指导的准确性，但是发布预测对于所有经理类型都是无成本的。因此，管理人员能够通过预测的准确性来表达自己的能力。尽管高能力管理者似乎会从发布指导中获得最大收益，但在均衡状态下，我们发现高能力管理者和低能力管理者都拒绝发布指导，而中间类型则进行了预测。因此，高能管理者会在均衡状态下反信号，这不会导致市场随后的“惩罚”。