This paper investigates welfare targeting for public goods in networks. First, we show that a tax/subsidy scheme (not necessarily budget-balanced) affects each consumer only insofar as it affects his neighbourhood. Second, we show that either a Pareto-improving income redistribution can be found or there exist Negishi weights, which we relate to the network structure. Third, in the case of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show that a Law of Welfare Targeting holds and links two well-known notions of the comparative statics of policy interventions: neutrality and welfare paradoxical effects. Collectively, our findings uncover the importance of the $-1$ eigenvalue to economic and social policy: it is an indication of how consumers absorb the impact of income redistribution.

本文研究了网络中公共物品的福利目标化。首先，我们表明税收/补贴计划（不一定是预算平衡的）仅在影响他所在社区的范围内影响每个消费者。其次，我们表明要么可以找到改善帕累托的收入再分配，要么存在与网络结构相关的 Negishi 权重。第三，在 Cobb-Douglas 偏好的情况下，我们表明福利目标法则成立并联系了政策干预的比较静态的两个众所周知的概念：中性和福利矛盾效应。总的来说，我们的发现揭示了$-1$ 经济和社会政策的特征值：它表明消费者如何吸收收入再分配的影响。