Abstract

What role could unconventional monetary policy – and particularly unconventional policies like private asset purchases under a quantitative easing or lender of last resort scheme – play in influencing economic growth directly? A wide literature in economics explores the pros and cons of using these policies. However, most studies also point to the uncertain and antagonistic legal basis for such purchases. In this paper, we show how the statutory mandate for nominal GDP targeting could best put in place the legal foundations for such asset purchases. We review the legislative and regulatory bases for private securities purchases made by central banks in a sample of countries. We discuss – if legislators and policymakers wanted to – how they might introduce clearer mandates to make such purchases into their public law. We finally show how legal authorizations for GDP targeting might (and probably should) provide for such authorisations. Our discussion sheds light on the fascinating and almost completely ignored area of public law, namely central bank law.

中文翻译：

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迈向中央银行立法的新的比较性公法：设计中央银行私人证券资产购买和名义GDP目标的立法授权

摘要

非常规的货币政策，尤其是非常规的政策，如在量化宽松政策或最后贷款人的计划下购买私人资产的非常规政策，在直接影响经济增长方面可以发挥什么作用？大量的经济学文献探讨了使用这些政策的利弊。但是，大多数研究还指出了此类购买的不确定和不利的法律依据。在本文中，我们展示了以名义GDP为目标的法定命令如何最好地为此类资产购买奠定法律基础。我们在一些国家/地区中审查了中央银行购买私人证券的法律和监管基础。我们将讨论（如果立法者和政策制定者愿意的话）他们将如何引入更明确的授权以将此类购买纳入其公法。最后，我们将展示针对GDP的法律授权如何（可能应该）提供此类授权。我们的讨论揭示了公共法的迷人之处，并且几乎完全被忽略，即中央银行法。